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FThis paper was originally published in Inquiry, 22, pages 231–241, 1979, now 
in SWAN Volume 10. he paper assumes as a general abstract norm that the specific 
otentialities of living beings be fulfilled. No being has a priority in 
rinciple in realizing its possibilities, but norms of increasing diversity 
r richness of potentialities put limits on the development of destructive 
ife-styles. Norm application is made to the mixed Norwegian 
ommunities of certain mammals and humans. A kind of modus vivendi 
s established that is firmly based on cultural tradition. It is unimportant 
hether the term “rights (of animals)” is or is not used in the work for 
eaceful human coexistence with a rich fauna. 
 
n recent years academic philosophers have paid increasing attention to 
he relations between humans and other living beings. One of the 
easons for this is a tragic paradox. In the industrialized states the 
verage material standard of living (measured conventionally) has 
eached a fabulously high level, the highest in the history of 
umankind. At the same time the number of animals, especially 
ammals, subjected to suffering and a severely restricted life-style in 
he richest countries has increased exponentially. Never have so many 
ighly sensitive beings been cruelty treated for such flimsy reasons. The 
ain effort to change this trend has been organized by people 
rofessionally engaged in trying to mitigate the economic crisis in 
candinavia (in 1979), that makes it even more difficult than usual to 
ake an impact on a political level. It is to be expected that cruel 
ractices supported through economic considerations will flourish in 
pite of mounting public concern. 
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The way animals are treated is determined not only economically and 
politically, but also through sets of general attitudes and beliefs, some 
of which are philosophically relevant. Academic philosophers have here 
a great variety of problems to choose from. “Do animals have rights?” 
is one that has been at the forefront. 
 
  
In what follows I shall outline the skeleton of a pattern of argument, T, 
which concludes with a version of the maxim, “Every living being 
should have an equal right to live and flourish.” In order to avoid too 
expensive an egalitarianism, the phrase “equal right” might be replaced 
by “equal right in principle.” The argument starts with some such 
sentence as “potential ought to be maximally realized.” Relying on 
various uses and connotations of “self,” we can also use an expression 
like “maximal self-realization!” These formulations are (of course 
imperfectly) expressive of the single normative premise needed in T. 
 
3 
The potentialities of human beings in the form of achievements and 
life-styles, and in other ways, are more complex and therefore greater 
than those of any other living beings on earth, at least at the present 
time. The maximal realization of these potentialities depends, however, 
on a vast number of conditions. Ecology (and especially human 
ecology) teaches us daily more about certain kinds of decencies. The 
manifestations of the capacity of sympathy and symbiosis teach us that 
there is a vast variety of ways of living together without destroying 
others’ potentials of realization. 
  
Maximal realization of potentials implies the utilization of the existing 
diversity of life-forms and capacities. Among the factors reducing 
diversity are the relations of “exclusivity,” the dependence of the 
maximal realization of the potentials of one life-form on the non-
maximal realization of potentials of some other forms. Clearly a policy 
of restraining certain forms and life-styles in favour of others is called 
for—in favour of those with high levels of symbiosis, or more 
generally, good potentialities of coexistence. 
  
This seems to suggest a very active interference in nature: defending the 
hunted against the hunters, the oppressed against the oppressors. But 
here ecology has taught us a very brutal lesson: our vast ignorance of 
the interdependence of life-forms and the often tragic consequences, for 
the hunted and the oppressed, of the elimination of the hunters and the 
oppressors. Interference has to be carried out with the utmost care. 
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There are various concepts of “diversity” in ecological literature. Here I 
shall rely on a fairly narrow concept such that one may assert, 
“Maximal realization of potentials implies maximal diversity.” 
 
4 
Complexity, in the qualitative sense of many-sidedness of life-style and 
of manifestations of life in general, may be safely said to increase from 
protozoa to vertebrates. Increase of complexity makes increase of 
diversity possible. Maximal realization of potentials thus implies 
maximal development of levels of complexity and maximal diversity at 
each level. 
  
In the argumentation pattern, T, “Maximal complexity!” is derived 
either directly from the basic norm or indirectly through asserting 
“Maximization of diversity implies maximization of complexity.” 
  
Among the classes of joint-legged animals (anthropoda), insects may 
safely be said to show the most pronounced diversity. Scolopenders are 
on roughly the same level of complexity but do not show comparable 
diversity. 
 
5 
The development of the nervous system is generally taken as proof of 
development of a capacity of joy and suffering, from vague feelings of 
lust or pain to extremely complex sentiments of positive, negative, or 
mixed kinds. 
  
The relation of joy and suffering to self-realization is differently 
conceived with different philosophies. Our argument-pattern makes use 
of Spinoza’s theories, asserting an inner relation between joy (laetitia) 
and increase of power of realization (potentia). Joy is not felt because 
of the realization of a potential, but is part of the very process of its 
realization. 
 
Spinozist theories are important when linking utilitarianism to self-
realization conceptions of ethics.1
 
6 
In spite of what has been said about the elimination of hunters and 
oppressors, we may safely assert as general maxims, “Exploitation 
reduces realization potentials” and “Subjection reduces realization 
potentials,” and derive “No exploitation!” and “No subjection!” 
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7 
Strict application of such slogans is of course Utopian in the worst 
senses of the term. The formulation of the slogans may be said both to 
point to possibilities of argumentation and to suggest impasses and 
absurdities. 
 
8 
Diversity implies self-determination in one important way: The more 
each particular being acts out of its own particular conatus—to use 
Spinoza’s term—the greater is potential diversity. On the other hand, 
self-determination at high levels of complexity implies complex 
societies with complex relations. (I presuppose that the ecological 
difference between complexity and complication is taken into account. 
Complicated social relations reduce many-sidedness.) 
  
To the maxims already introduced we now tentatively add “Maximum 
self-determination!” 
 
9 
The way in which I have talked about life-forms and life-styles suggests 
that it is species and other collective units, not particular living beings, 
which realize potentialities. I do not rule out the possibility of self-
realization of collectivities but prefer to think only of particular beings, 
particular humans, frogs, hookworms. 
  
Many ecologists lament the preoccupation of ethics with particular 
specimens instead of populations. They demand a greater ethical 
concern with populations and animal and human societies, less 
preoccupation with the fate of individuals. Some add that the highest 
concern should be for ecosystems, not individuals, societies, or species. 
What is most needed is system ethics, especially strict ethical norms 
concerning the destruction of ecosystems. I presuppose in what follows 
that the arguments of these ecologists are taken seriously, but 
nevertheless persist in thinking of the realization of the potentials of 
particular living beings. 
  
So much for argument-pattern T. Many contemporary authors reason 
along similar lines, as, for instance, the author of “The Right Not to Be 
Eaten” in evaluating diversity, symbiosis, and other factors. One of his 
conclusions is that 
the natural telos is a diversified environment in which organic beings are capable 
of symbiosis as well as spontaneity (localized autonomy) and  . . . any practice 
which inhibits the development of this type of environment ought to be 
discontinued. Since meat-eating is a conspicuous example of a human practice 
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which has this effect, it should be discontinued, and a right not to be eaten should 
be ascribed to animals.2
The ought-sentence may be derived from the basic norm of argument 
pattern T. The general ascription today, e.g., by a resolution of the 
United Nations Assembly, of a right not to be eaten would, I think, 
elicit considerable mirth and some ire. Our author surely did not, 
however, have such a possibility in mind. More informal declarations of 
animal rights might well contain the ascription. 
  
The assertion that is “wasteful to sacrifice a more highly organized 
being when a lesser being will do” might be taken as a guideline 
indirectly derivable from the slogan, “Maximize complexity!” 
Completely to destroy a highly organized being’s possibilities of 
realization is to eliminate greater possibilities than when a less 
organized, and therefore on the whole less complex, being is sacrificed. 
  
If the highly organized specimen is old and sick, people would tend to 
sacrifice it rather than the young, healthy, but somewhat less complex 
specimen. At this point I hope most readers would feel a certain disgust 
suddenly seeing the implication of a rigid application of such 
“measurements” of possibilities within the framework of human 
societies. Social Darwinism is just around the corner! 
  
The relations of the “potentialities of realization” guideline to Van 
DeVeer’s criterion of “two factor egalitarianism” are rather 
complicated.”3 Let us, for instance, take the relation of bears to sheep 
and to humans. The eating of sheep-flesh is not taken to be of high 
“level or importance of interest” to bears in general. But to some bears 
it clearly is. Unfortunately we are not able to help a bear give up that 
interest. Sheep-owners, on the other hand, have a strong economic 
interest in keeping their sheep alive. Even if the compensation they 
receive for the loss of a sheep is enough to buy two new sheep, and they 
thus make a profit out of the killing, sheep-owners have an interest in 
avoiding the killing. This has to do with local sheep-owners’ personal 
relations to their sheep, their rejection of cruelty, and many other 
factors. They also attribute intrinsic value to bears, and thus letting 
bears live is an interest in favour of maintaining intrinsic values. So 
much for adapting the terminology of “interest” to my own analysis. 
The transition to “potentialities of realization” terminology is not very 
problematic. Damage to interests corresponds to reduction of 
potentialities. Thus severe threats to economic interests correspond to 
possibilities of severely reduced self-realization. 
 
10 
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It belongs to the special capacities of humans to recognize similarities 
and differences between humans and other life-forms. Some differences 
elicit feelings of strangeness, fear, or dislike, and favour attitudes of 
hostility, avoidance, or indifference. Similarities, live sensitivity to pain 
or to behaviour as if in pain, elicit sympathy and attitudes of 
identification. Relying on accounts of human nature, like those of 
Spinoza, especially his account of free humans in the later parts of Part 
4 of the Ethics, I maintain that high levels of realization of human 
potentialities in their intrinsic values and their equal right (in principle) 
to live and flourish. Upon this general attitude, however, is 
superimposed a vast differentiation according to which form of life or 
which life-style is under consideration or—better—met with in action. 
  
Remaining at the rather abstract level, I assert as part of argument-
pattern T: “The higher the level of realization of the potentials of a 
living being, the greater the dependence of further increase in level 
upon the increase of the level of other living beings.” 
  
What this says is, in its extreme form, that the absolutely highest level 
of self-realization cannot be reached by anybody without all others also 
reaching that level. (A kind of parallel to Mahayana theories of highest 
levels of freedom.) 
  
The view that human nature is such as ultimately to demand a sort of 
egalitarianism of life-forms in the biosphere may of course be judged 
simply wrong without disturbing the other arguments of the argument-
pattern. The view is mentioned here simply because, if tenable, it lends 
support to the ultimate normative premise stated at the beginning of this 
article. 
 
11 
How, if the above is accepted, are we to implement or give expression 
to the norms stated? How are our policies towards animals to be stated 
and carried out in particular cases? 
  
There are many ways of approaching these vast problems. I shall 
confine myself to mentioning, in order just to illustrate one approach, 
the procedures of wild-animal “management” in Scandinavia, 
particularly in Norway, and I shall limit myself to considering two not 
very important species, the brown bear and the wolf.4
 
12 
Bears and humans live in overlapping territories in southern Norway. 
Conflicts arise because some bears develop a habit of killing sheep. No 
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sheep-owner thinks that all bears in his area should be killed. The 
cultural pattern is such that bears are considered to have a right to live 
and flourish. They are considered to have a value in themselves. The 
problem is one of co-existence with humans and with sheep. 
  
When sheep are killed in southern Norway and a bear seems to have 
been responsible, an expert is called in. He investigates closely the way 
the sheep has been killed and notes all the signs of the presence of the 
bear. Knowing the various habits of practically all the bears of the 
area—even if he has not actually seen them—he is generally able to tell 
not only whether a bear has been there, but also which bear. 
  
The sheep-owner is paid an indemnity if the expert arrives at the 
conclusion that a bear is responsible. If that bear has been guilty of 
similar “crimes,” a verdict may be reached that it has forfeited its right 
to existence. An expert bear-hunter is given license to kill it, but if he 
does not succeed, a whole team of hunters is mobilized. (Somewhat 
inexplicably, bears are able under such circumstances to hide for years, 
which is deeply embarrassing, as well as mystifying for the hunters.) 
 
13 
Many factors are considered before a bear is condemned to death. What 
is his or her total record of misdeeds? How many sheep have been 
killed? Does he or she mainly kill to eat, or does he or she maim or hurt 
sheep without eating? Is particular cruelty shown? Is it a bear mother 
who will probably influence her cubs in a bad way? Did the sheep enter 
the heart of a bear area or did the bear stray far into established sheep 
territory? 
  
Even if the terminology of the argumentation for or against the death 
warrant differs from that of human trials, the social and ethical norms 
invoked are similar. One may speak of the area’s life community, a 
community comprising wild animals, domesticated animals, and 
humans. 
  
The use of the term “community” in this way does not satisfy the strong 
requirement proposed by Passmore, but it satisfies that of Clark in his 
article “The Rights of Wild Things.”5 I myself accept broader senses of 
the term as perfectly legitimate. 
 
14 
The interaction between the members of the community is not 
systematically codified. How to do that, and in what terminology, is an 
interesting philosophical problem. 
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Sheep-owners and others are interested in clarifying the norms because 
of an increasing friction between bears and humans: for economic 
reasons sheep are no longer tended, the norm that sheep be protected 
against wild animals by the presence of a shepherd is invalidated 
through higher norms of profitability. The economy is capital—not 
labour—intensive. 
  
From the norm to make Norway more “self-reliant,” there is also now a 
government-supported norm to increase the number of sheep and the 
area of their grazing. Very old, established bear territories are invaded. 
Added to this is the further complication that the number of bears is 
increasing. 
  
If our present economic crisis (1979) does not grow worse, a modus 
vivendi comparatively favourable to bears may ensue. But if it deepens 
the bear territories will probably be “developed.” It will be found 
“necessary” to introduce more sheep. Bears will meet sheep more 
often—with bad consequences for both. 
  
Ecologists who assess the destruction by bears and who give advice 
both to sheep-owners and representatives of the public, try to fulfill the 
wishes of sheep-owners fully enough to ensure that they do not begin 
breaking the law: killing bears without a warrant. As professional 
students of bears and of impressive, old ecosystems, the ecologists 
think it wise of the public to give greater support to the interests of the 
bears than at present. Such a policy presupposes that the public become 
better informed and that the economic crisis is not deepening. 
  
Comparing Regan’s approach6 to my own, mine seems more aposteriori 
and less élitist. The ascription of rights to animals frequently occurs 
among “ordinary” people, that is, people without special formal 
education. It is their use, rather than that of people versed in law or 
philosophy, that guides my own. Philosophers might find 
inconsistencies and obscurities in ordinary ways of using “rights” and 
similar terms, but I think that this is mostly because they do not 
acknowledge the intricacies of everyday usages. 
  
A widely read Norwegian book and pamphlet in favour of Declaration 
of Rights of Animals elicited counter-arguments, not complaints that 
the key terms (rett, rettighet) were meaningless when applied to 
animals.7 Thousands subscribed to the declaration contained in the 
pamphlet. Others found its sweeping character Utopian in the sense of 
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completely unrealistic. Empirical semantic analysis would, I think, 
make it plausible that “rett” as used in the texts and debates had fairly 
definite connotations. On the basis of such empirical work, I think 
philosophers may tentatively introduce conceptual frameworks 
incorporating the concept of animal rights. 
  
It may be wiser, however, not to introduce the term “right” in 
codifications of norms covering animal/human interaction, or only to 
assert conditionals: “If we recognize that there are rights (at all), then . . 
.” (cf. Regan).8
 
15 
We will mention wolves only very briefly.  Their cultural setting is very 
different from that of bears. There is a great respect for bears, whereas 
wolves are more dreaded than respected. A bear’s character traits are 
considered more sympathetic. Some consider wolves dangerous: 
hungry wolves may attack people. (Most or all stories of such attacks in 
the last hundred years, however, are falsified or extremely doubtful.) 
  
The very right to live is brought into the debate. In recent years, 
however, wolves have not been guilty of a single verified misdeed. 
They are rarely seen and very careful to keep out of trouble. There is 
therefore a reasonable chance that the live communities comprising a 
(fairly small) number of wolves will persist. 
 
16 
In referring to animals here I have used the terms “responsible,” 
“guilty,” “misdeed,” “crime,” “cruelty,” and “careful.” They belong, 
together with the term “right,” to the vast number of words with 
connotations mostly found in debates on purely human behaviour, but 
which are also found in fairly precise argumentation involving the 
attitudes and behaviours of different species. It is sometimes important 
to be strict in keeping the two uses apart, but never wise to try to 
eradicate the wider ones. 
  
People speak of the right of certain animals to hunt within certain 
territories, and to drink at certain places along rivers. Further, to use 
certain trails. Thus, if the human use of those trails or their cutting by a 
road prevents the animal from using them, these actions are forbidden. 
There is also talk about the right to light and to movement, to free air, 
etc. in mechanized agriculture. Instead of rejecting the possibilities of 
there being such rights, I would recommend arguing for the same goals 
without using the terminology of rights. 
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McCloskey argues very carefully that animals cannot have rights if they 
do not have the relevant moral capacities. 
 
Although there is limited evidence in respect of certain animals of a capacity for 
seeming “self-sacrificing,” “disinterested,” “benevolent,” actions in limited, 
somewhat arbitrary areas, there is no real evidence of a capacity to make moral 
judgments, morally to discriminate when self-sacrifice, gratitude, loyalty, 
benevolence is morally appropriate, and more relevantly, to assess their moral 
rights and to exercise them within their moral limits. However, further research on 
animals such as whales and dolphins, although seemingly not in respect of 
monkeys, apes, chimpanzees, may yet reveal that man is not the only animal 
capable of being a bearer of rights.9
 
What seems to be lacking is a non-circular, convincing argument for the 
conclusion that animals must have certain moral capacities in order to 
have rights. In fact I do not find any pro-arguments in McCloskey’s 
paper. Here, as in the case of Regan, I would study occurrences of the 
term “right” among ordinary people and inspect with interest its 
possible connotations, some of which seem non-contradictory and 
useful within certain limits. 
  
Favouring a Spinozan ethics without a separate realm of morals, I 
would adhere to views expressed by ordinary people who ascribe rights 
to bears without attributing moral capacities to them. 
 
17 
I do not see any inconsistency in maintaining both the general maxim of 
species egalitarianism in principle (“the equal right in principle of all 
species to live and flourish”) and the norms which make it more 
difficult for a wolf than for a bear to be accepted as a member of a 
mixed community. The general maxim is a vague abstract guideline that 
has to be embedded in a philosophy of culture. This philosophy is again 
to be embedded in a social (including economic) framework connecting 
philosophy with daily life. 
   
The codification of interrelationships between large, wild mammals and 
humans is an interdisciplinary task that calls for intimate co-operation 
between people from many walks of life. The same holds good for other 
areas of present-day conflict between animals and humans. Sprigge 
stresses that “the details of an acceptable code” of a certain kind 
“cannot be worked out solely on the basis of philosophical first 
principles,” and requires the “combination of appropriate expertise with 
a developed moral sense . . .”10 I too would like to underline the 
importance of layman participation. 
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It is a good sign for those of us who represent academic philosophy that 
people seek an opportunity to talk the problems over from a wide 
perspective, including the religious and the philosophical. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 From the above use of the expression “realization of potentialities” it is clear that the 
concept is wider than most concepts of self-realization in Western philosophy and 
psychology, for instance that of Abraham Maslow. It is more closely linked to 
concepts of life-fulfillment and Eastern conceptions, as for instance Gandhi’s concept 
of self-realization. For more about this see A. Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict. An 
Exploration of Satyagraha, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1974 (now SWAN 5), and 
Økologi samfunn og livsstil. Utkast til en Økosofi, Universitetsforlaget, 5th ed., 1976. 
The concept used in T is also close to Spinoza’s “increase in power,” where potentia 
is linked to capability (posse), that is, capacity to act with oneself as adequate cause. I 
do not pretend that these remarks are more than initial formulations in a dialogue on 
self-realization. 
2 Thomas Auxter, 1979, “The Right Not to be Eaten,” Inquiry:22: p. 227. 
3 “Two Factor Egalitarianism assumes the relevance of two matters: (1) level or 
importance of interests to each being in a conflict of interests, and (2) the 
psychological capacities of the parties whose interests conflict.” Donald Van DeVeer, 
1979, “Interspecific Justice,” Inquiry 22,  p. 68. 
4 What follows is inspired by the practical work of the bear inspector, and eco-
philosopher, Ivar Mysterud. 
5 Stephen R. L. Clark, 1979, “The Rights of Wild Things,” Inquiry 22, pp. 183–4. 
6 Tom Regan, 1979, “An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning 
Animal Rights,” Inquiry 22, pp. 189–219. 
7 The Rights of Animals (Dyrenes rettigheter, Oslo 1974) and Declaration of Rights of 
Animals (1972). 
8 Regan, op. cit. 
9 H. J. McCloskey, 1979, “Moral Rights and Animals,” Inquiry 22, p. 42. 
10 T. L. S. Sprigge, 1979, “Metaphysics, Physicalism, and Animal Rights,” Inquiry 22, 
p. 134. 
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